Asian Journal of Political Science

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

ISSN: 0218-5377 (Print) 1750-7812 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasi20

Still a new democracy? Individual-level effects of social trust on political trust in South Korea

Juheon Lee & Daniel Yi

To cite this article: Juheon Lee & Daniel Yi (2018): Still a new democracy? Individual-level effects of social trust on political trust in South Korea, Asian Journal of Political Science

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2018.1488595

Published online: 18 Jun 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rasi20

ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2018.1488595

Still a new democracy? Individual-level effects of social trust on political trust in South Korea

Juheon Lee and Daniel Yi

Department of Political Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

ABSTRACT
The social capital theory holds that there is a positive relationship between social and political trust; however, despite the prominence of this postulation, this relationship has often been disputed among political scientists. While recent studies on advanced democracies have shown a strong positive relationship between social and political trust, studies on East Asian democracies, which previously showed a weak or negative relation, remain scant, separating these countries into their own category of new democracies. The motivation of this study is based on the importance of revisiting the relationship between social and political trust using recent data from one such country—South Korea—to determine the nature of this previously studied negative or weak relationship. The results of this study indicate that generalized social trust in South Korea is positively associated with political trust. This result is in line with recent findings in advanced democracies. While this positive relationship is consistent and significant across models, a greater portion of political trust is explained by economic and political performance, including factors such as the economy, corruption, inequality, and the welfare system, making institutional performance a critical predictor of political trust.

KEYWORDS
Social Capital; Social Trust; Political Trust; East Asian Democracies; South Korea

1. Introduction

While political and social trust in democracy have long been considered closely intertwined, the social capital theory has particularly emphasized the 'bottom-up' process in which citizens' trust in political institutions is rooted in vibrant civic engagements and norms of trust among citizens (Liu & Stolle, 2017; Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). As the essence of social capital, social trust enhances the quality of democratic governance; societies with high levels of social trust tend to have effective political institutions, increasing citizens' confidence in political institutions and leading to the sustainability of the democratic system (Fukuyama, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005; Newton & Norris, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Putnam et al., 1993; Uslaner, 2002).

Despite the prevalence of the theory, the relationship between social and political trust has not always been supported by empirical evidence, especially for some Asian

CONTACT Juheon Lee lee.juhe@husky.neu.edu
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

democracies. According to Liu and Stolle's (2017) study on the research trend of social capital studies, some early studies on social and political trust showed a weak connection between the two, but the studies conducted after the year 2000 yielded results that indicated a moderate to strong relationship; however, they noted that a caveat to the findings was that significant exceptions were found in some East Asian democracies, which complicates the theory (e.g. Kim, 2005; Kong, 2013). The caveat was explained by emphasizing the countries' status as new democracies, implying that the countries' still nascent and incomplete democratic institutions and cultures prolong the discrepancy between the two trusts. This study examined the problem related to South Korea, one of two 'consolidated third-wave' democracies in East Asia, the other being Taiwan (Park, 2017, p. 488). During this study, it was assumed that although fully-functional democratic governance requires long-term efforts, defining a consolidated democracy as an 'outlier' requires further research; otherwise, it may severely compromise the generalizability of the theory.

One objective of this study on South Korea was to contribute to the literature on social capital and political trust in democracy. Previous studies on South Korea (or on East Asia that included South Korea) that showed a strong negative or a weak positive relationship between the two trusts have focused on the time period from the early- to mid-2000s and have not been supported by more recent data sources. Moreover, studies on social and political trust have heavily focused on the trilateral countries. Therefore, reexamining the relationship using newly published data can provide insight into whether the South Korean case can contribute to the generalizability of the theory or should remain an outlier. Also, the results of this study can help pinpoint the position of a third-wave democracy in relation to traditional advanced democracies, providing implications not only for the social capital theory but also for broader democratic theories.

The article is organized into four sections. The first section introduces social capital literature. The section explains the major origins of generalized social trust and its relationship with citizens' trust in political institutions considering political institutions' economic and political performance. The second section describes the data, measurement of key variables, and methods. The third section reports the empirical analysis of social trust, institutional performance, and political trust. Finally, the article is concluded by discussing the implications that can be drawn from the empirical evidence.

2. Social and political trust

Since De Tocqueville (2003) suggested that the development of American democracy originates from citizens' vibrant associational lives, which leads to their habitual participation, democratic theorists have studied the role of civic associations in generating social norms that underlie a stable and effective democracy. Following Tocqueville, pluralist theories popularized in the 1960s emphasized the role of interest groups in aggregating public demands and providing multiple channels of political participation, linking citizens to the state (e.g. Dahl, 1961). Meanwhile, Weber's discussion of the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism in Europe laid the foundation for cultural theories of democracy (Weber, 2002). Cultural theorists have stressed the process of modernization (or postmodernization), which changes the patterns of political development and the political behaviours of citizens (e.g. Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart, 1990,

1999; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Despite some differences, pluralist theories and cultural theories both recognize the importance of social characteristics in generating cooperative relations between individual citizens to facilitate their trust in democratic institutions (Norris, 2011). Among the scholars who have studied social trust, some have focused on macro-level norms and trust shared collectively within a society, while others have investigated micro-level socialization and interactions that gradually lead to institutional success and democratic stability (see Mishler & Rose, 2001). This study lends support to the latter group of scholars by examining both individual-level trust in others and trust in political institutions.

The social capital theory, popularized by Putnam et al. (1993) and Putnam (2001), reinforced the assumption that social characteristics nurture political trust. Social capital is a broader concept than civic culture in that it does not limit itself to the civic aspects of social relations: personal networks and exclusive groups are also viewed as 'bonding' social capital (Almond & Verba, 1963; Liu & Stolle, 2017; Putnam, 2001, p. 22). Putnam et al. (1993) suggested that high levels of social capital tend to provide positive input to political institutions through vivacious political interactions, leading to improved institutional performance and citizen satisfaction. Rather than viewing social capital as merely instrumental to individuals or groups, as in some previous sociological studies (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Loury, 1977), Putnam attempted to relate social capital to the production of public goods, such as trustworthiness and a spirit of the cooperation of a society (Foley & Edwards, 1999). Although various measurements were suggested by Putnam, subsequent social capital studies have paid special attention to social trust as the essence of social capital and to the relationship between social trust and political trust (see Liu & Stolle, 2017; Van der Meer & Zmerli, 2017; Zmerli & Newton, 2008).

Social trust is one's belief that other people are generally trustworthy and are integral parts of society (Inglehart, 1999; Uslaner, 2002). It originates from various social-psychological and social-cultural factors, such as individuals' demographic characteristics, personality, achievements, membership in associations, and social networks and the characteristics of community and society (Delhey & Newton, 2003). Social trust tends to maintain cooperative norms among citizens, facilitate collective behaviour, and establish high-performing social institutions that create good government and stable democracy; therefore, social and political trust are closely associated and interdependent (Fukuyama, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Newton, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Uslaner, 2002).

Nevertheless, despite the suggested 'prima facie' relationship, some empirical evidence did not show a robust relationship between social trust and political trust. For example, Kaase (1999) examined the relationship between interpersonal and political trust in nine European countries and found that the statistical relationship between the two types of trust is minimal. Newton (2001) pointed out that the level of satisfaction with politics in Japan was low between the 1970s and the early 1990s, but levels of social capital in Japanese society still increased by most measures. Newton speculated that the weak relationship between social and political trust may have been affected by the poor performance of political institutions, such as 'political corruption or incompetence, external shock to the system, high inflation or unemployment, poor economic performance, or defeat in war' (Newton, 2001, p. 212). In line with Newton's argument, institutional

theories challenge the importance of the 'cultural' embeddedness of political trust. While acknowledging that social trust affects political support in the long-term, they argue that political trust is a rational response produced by the short-term performance of institutions (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005; Norris, 1999). Likewise, the social capital theory does not negate that institutional performance affects political trust; rather, it is assumed that as a cultural phenomenon, social trust serves as a firm basis for political trust, regardless of the fluctuating performance of political institutions (Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Suh, Chang, & Lim, 2012).

Despite these challenges, Liu and Stolle (2017) showed that post-2000 studies have had greater success in uncovering a strong relationship between social and political trust (e.g. Newton & Zmerli, 2011; Oskarsson, 2010; Schyns & Koop, 2010; Sonderskov & Dinesen, 2014). They argued that this strong relationship between social and political trust indicated by recent studies may be due to the recent development of survey instruments, the poor performance of political institutions in the past that affected the otherwise strong relationship between the two trusts, or the fact that the relationship has actually changed over time. A conclusion could not be drawn regarding the causes of this change in this study because additional empirical evidence must be accumulated to uncover the true relationship between the two types of trust. Instead, this study focused on the caveat in the trend, which is that East Asian democracies are outliers. The aforementioned studies heavily focused on the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Contrary to the findings of these studies, post-2000 studies on other East Asian new democracies, which include South Korea, have mostly shown strong negative or weak positive relationships between the two trusts. As Liu and Stolle pointed out, Kim's study (2005) on South Korea, during which a national survey conducted in 2001 was used, and Kong's study (2013) on Asian democracies using the 2004 Asian Barometer Survey showed negative relations between the two types of trust. Moreover, Suh et al. (2012) examined the sources of political trust using the Korean General Social Survey conducted between 2003 and 2005 and found an insignificant positive relationship between interpersonal trust and political trust. For Choi and Woo's recent study (2016) on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the 2006 Asian Barometer survey was used, and they also found that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between the two types of trust.

The findings of the previous studies motivated this study in two ways. First, these studies used national or international surveys conducted in the early- or mid-2000s when South Korea was still implementing market-oriented reforms and putting forth anti-corruption efforts during the process of recovering from Asian financial crises (Kang, 2015; Kim, 2010). Therefore, it is argued that whether the findings resulted from the newly established nature of the democracies as well as whether more recent survey results could provide a new perspective are unclear. Second, the rise of critical citizens with stronger self-expression values and vibrant civil engagement were continuously observed and reported in South Korea during the 2000s, calling for high-functioning, mediating institutions between the state and society (Kim, 2010; Kim, 2012; Norris, 1999; Oh, 2012; Rose, Shin, & Munro, 1999; Choi & Woo, 2016). A possible change in the relationship between social and political trust as a result of this process can provide meaningful insight into the development of South Korea's democracy.

3. Method

The data were collected from a national survey entitled the Social Integration Survey, which was carried out by the Korea Institute of Public Administration, a government-sponsored research institute that studies conflict management, governance, and social capital. The available datasets covering the years from 2013 to 2015 were obtained. A multi-state stratified random sampling method was employed to select respondents for each year who were aged 19 and older across South Korea. A total of 20,200 respondents (5000 for 2013, 7500 for 2014, and 7700 for 2015) participated in this three-year survey. Face-to-face interviews were conducted for the completion of the survey. Because the key variables—social trust and political trust—have four-level categories in the survey, both an ordinal logistic regression and a multinomial logistic regression could be performed; however, multinomial logistic models were chosen to determine whether the relationship between the independent and dependent variable differs significantly for different values of the dependent variable. To net out the time-invariant and province-invariant factors, fixed effects were used for different years (2013, 2014, and 2015) and 17 provincial-level regions (8 provinces, 6 metropolitan cities, 1 special self-governing province, 1 special city, and 1 metropolitan autonomous city). Furthermore, to manage heteroscedasticity, standard errors were clustered by both years and provinces.

For generalized social trust, the most commonly used question in international social surveys, such as The World Value Survey, The Asian Barometer, and The East Asian Social Survey, is 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Respondents are asked to choose among 'Trusted,' 'Careful,' and 'Don't know'; however, the Social Integration Survey includes a question that measures Korean citizens' level of generalized social trust: 'Generally speaking, how much do you think you can trust other people?' Each respondent chose among the four suggested ordinal answers: 'not at all,' 'not much,' 'somewhat,' and 'a great deal.' Although the categories are subjective, these ordinal categories can allow for a better estimation of the impact of each level of social trust on political trust.

For trust in political institutions, the respondents were asked, 'To what extent do you trust each of these institutions?' Among the various social and political institutions suggested, seven political institutions were analyzed: central government, parliament, judicial branch, the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, police, local government, and military. Each respondent was asked to choose among four suggested answers: 'not at all,' 'not much,' 'somewhat,' and 'a great deal.' For measuring political trust, some studies used respondents' averaged trust for all suggested political institutions (e.g. Chang & Chu, 2006; Choi & Woo, 2016; Mishler & Rose, 2005). Other studies used trust in the most influential political institution, such as the central government (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005) or parliament (e.g. Kim, 2005; Newton, 2006). In this study, political trust refers to the averaged trust for the seven political institutions; however, two models were used separately for trust in government and trust in parliament.

Other variables were included to test the social and cultural determinants of trust in South Korea. According to Delhey and Newton (2003), determinants of trust include personal demographic characteristics, success and well-being, voluntary organization, social networks, and community conditions, all of which were analyzed. As personal demographic characteristics, gender (0 = Women, 1 = Men), age (five ordinal categories), and

education (three ordinal categories) were included. For individuals' success and well-being, respondents' life satisfaction (11-point continuous scale) and monthly household income (three ordinal categories) were included. For participation in voluntary associations, respondents were asked about their involvement in seven associations: political associations, unions and professional associations, community-based associations, civic movement organizations, religious organizations, leisure societies, and alumni associations. Respondents' answers were coded into a binary categorical variable (0 for 'do not participate' and 1 for 'participate'). For social networks, respondents were asked if they have close friends and neighbours whom they can ask for economic, physical, or emotional support. The answers were coded as binary categories (0 for 'none' and 1 for 'more than one'). For community conditions, respondents' duration of residence and urban/rural distinctions were coded.

Political trust is not only determined by social and cultural factors but also by the performance of political institutions (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2001, 2005). To test the institutionalist argument, four performance variables were included: economy, inequality, corruption, and welfare. Poor economic performance and political corruption are critical indicators of political institutions' performance (Newton, 2001), and inequality and the welfare system are key indicators of South Koreans' satisfaction with democracy (Kang, 2015). For economic performance, respondents were asked to evaluate the country's macro-economic situation on a 10-point continuous scale. For inequality, respondents were asked, 'To what extent do you think the below social conflicts are serious?' For the 'conflicts between the haves and the have-nots' category, 'serious' was coded as 1 and other answers as 0. Regarding corruption, respondents were asked, 'How much do you think the below organizations are corrupt?' Sixteen types of organizations were listed: government departments, congress, courts, public attorneys, police, local governments, military, labour unions, civil movement groups, TV, newspapers, educational organizations, hospitals, large firms, religious organizations, and financial organizations. Each respondent's perception of corruption was averaged for the 16 types of organizations and then coded into a binary categorical variable (0 for 'not corrupt' and 1 for 'corrupt'). For welfare, respondents were asked, "Do you think the below opportunities are fair?" In the 'welfare' category, answers were coded into a binary categorical variable (0 for 'not fair' and 1 for 'fair'). The descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1.

4. Results

In the first stage, the impacts of personal demographic characteristics, success and well-being, participation in voluntary organizations, social networks, and community conditions on the level of social trust were assessed. Because social trust has four-level categories ('Not at all,' 'Not much,' 'Somewhat,' and 'A great deal'), the multinomial logistic regression provided three sets of coefficients that reflect the impacts of the independent variables on the likelihood of respondents answering 'Not much,' Somewhat,' and 'A great deal' using 'Not at all' as the comparison category. In addition, the coefficients were exponentiated to compare the odds ratios (OR). The results are shown in Table 2. Gender and age did not have a significant effect on any level of social trust; however, education was shown to have significant positive effects on 'Somewhat' ($B = 0.116$, OR = 1.123, $p < 0.05$) and 'A great deal' ($B = 0.188$, OR = 1.107, $p < 0.01$). Thus, those with a high level

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables.

	Value Label	Mean	SD
Social Trust	1. Not at all	2.73	0.59
	2. Not much		
	3. Somewhat		
	4. A great deal		
Political Trust	1. Not at all	2.22	0.64
	2. Not much		
	3. Somewhat		
	4. A great deal		
Personal demographic characteristics			
Gender	0. Female	0.49	0.50
	1. Male		
Age	1. 19–29	2.98	1.32
	2. 30–39		
	3. 40–49		
	4. 50–59		
	5. 60–69		
Education	1 Primary	2.39	0.62
	2 Secondary		
	3 Tertiary		
Success and well-being			
Life satisfaction	0. Least satisfied	5.79	1.94
	…		
	10. Most satisfied		
Household Income	1. Low income	1.63	0.62
	2. Middle income		
	3. High income		
Voluntary associations			
Political associations	0. Do not participate	0.02	0.14
	1. Participate		
Unions and professional associations	0. Do not participate	0.03	0.18
	1. Participate		
Community-based associations	0. Do not Participate	0.10	0.31
	1. Participate		
Civic movement organization	0. Do not participate	0.02	0.15
	1. Participate		
Religious organizations	0. Do not participate	0.17	0.38
	1. Participate		
Leisure societies	0. Do not participate	0.20	0.40
	1. Participate		
Alumni associations	0. Do not participate	0.35	0.48
	1. Participate		
Social networks			
Having close friends and neighbours	0. None	0.95	0.22
	1. More than one		
Community condition			
Duration of Residence	1. Less than 1 year	3.80	1.35
	2. 1–3 years		
	3. 3–5 years		
	4. 5–10 years		
	5. More than 10 years		
Urban	0. Rural	0.80	0.40
	1. Urban		
Economic and political performance			
Economic situation	0. Least satisfied	3.77	1.97
	…		
	10. Most satisfied		
Corruption	0. Not corrupted	0.38	0.48
	1. Corrupted		
Inequality	0. Not serious	0.31	0.46
	1. Very serious		
Welfare	0. Not fair	0.43	0.50
	1. Fair		

Table 2. Determinants of social trust in South Korea.

	'Not much'		'Somewhat'		'A great deal'	
Social Trust (Reference: 'Not at all')	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR
Gender (male = 1)	0.034 (0.099)	1.034	−0.031 (0.098)	0.969	0.056 (0.117)	1.057
Age	−0.001 (0.047)	0.999	0.018 (0.046)	1.018	−0.024 (0.054)	0.976
Education	0.022 (0.051)	1.022	0.116** (0.050)	1.123	0.188*** (0.059)	1.207
Life satisfaction	0.123*** (0.024)	1.131	0.219*** (0.024)	1.244	0.340*** (0.029)	1.405
Income	0.035 (0.028)	1.035	0.065** (0.027)	1.066	0.081** (0.032)	1.084
Association						
Political associations	−1.212*** (0.303)	0.297	−1.005*** (0.285)	0.366	−0.646** (0.331)	0.523
Unions and professional associations	0.778** (0.387)	2.176	0.774** (0.381)	2.167	0.983** (0.405)	2.671
Community-based associations	−0.065 (0.050)	0.936	−0.041 (0.049)	0.959	0.031 (0.057)	1.031
Civic movement organization	0.536 (0.398)	1.709	0.451 (0.389)	1.570	0.720* (0.418)	2.054
Religious organizations	0.052 (0.143)	1.053	0.190 (0.140)	1.209	0.356** (0.159)	1.427
Leisure societies	−0.447*** (0.135)	0.639	−0.281** (0.131)	0.754	0.120 (0.150)	1.127
Alumni associations	0.228* (0.120)	1.256	0.450*** (0.131)	1.568	0.436*** (0.136)	1.546
Having close friends and neighbours	0.832*** (0.143)	2.298	1.390*** (0.142)	4.014	1.297*** (0.226)	3.659
Duration of residence	0.084** (0.038)	1.087	0.052 (0.037)	1.053	0.063 (0.044)	1.065
Urban	0.072 (0.139)	1.074	−0.080 (0.137)	0.923	−0.375** (0.164)	0.687
Intercepts	0.573 (0.427)	1.826	−0.002 (0.419)	1.028	−3.359*** (0.532)	0.036
Observations	19,690					
Pseudo *R*-squared (Nagelkerke)	0.132					
Pseudo *R*-squared (CoxSnell)	0.110					
AIC	33,365.6					

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

of education were 1.123 times (or 12.3%) more likely to answer 'Somewhat' than 'Not at all' and 1.207 times (or 20.7%) more likely to answer 'A great deal' than 'Not at all.' Life satisfaction was also positively associated with social trust: in reference to 'Not at all,' the odds of responding 'Not much' ($B = 0.123$, OR = 1.131, $p < 0.01$), 'Somewhat' ($B = 0.219$, OR = 1.244, $p < 0.01$), and 'A great deal' ($B = 0.340$, OR = 1.405, $p < 0.01$) increased with statistical significance. Household income had positive effects on social trust: it significantly increased the odds of responding 'Somewhat' ($B = 0.065$, OR = 1.066, $p < 0.05$) and 'A great deal' ($B = 0.081$, OR = 1.084, $p < 0.05$) compared to responding 'Not at all.'

The effects of participation in association on social trust differed based on the type of association. Those who actively participated in unions and professional associations were 2.176 times more likely to answer 'Not much' ($B = 0.778$, OR = 2.176, $p < 0.05$), 2.167 times more likely to answer 'Somewhat' ($B = 0.774$, OR = 2.167, $p < 0.05$), and 2.671 times more likely to answer 'A great deal' ($B = 0.983$, OR =2.671, $p < 0.05$) relative to 'Not at all.' Among those who actively participated in alumni associations, the odds of

answering ‘Not much’ were 1.256 times higher ($B = 0.228$, OR = 1.256, $p < 0.10$), the odds of answering ‘Somewhat’ were 1.568 times higher ($B = 0.450$, OR = 1.568, $p < 0.01$), and the odds of answering ‘A great deal’ were 1.546 times higher ($B = 0.436$, OR = 1.546, $p < 0.01$) than the odds of answering ‘Not at all.’ Participation in civic movement organizations ($B = 0.720$, OR = 2.054, $p < 0.10$) and participation in religious organizations ($B = 0.356$, OR = 1.427, $p < 0.05$) only showed significant positive effects on responding ‘A great deal.’

Not all types of associations served as a source of social trust. Those who actively participated in political associations were 71.3% (= 100 * 1−[exp(−1.212)]) less likely to respond ‘Not much’ ($B = -1.212$, OR = 0.297, $p < 0.01$), 53.4% (= 100 * 1−[exp(−1.005)]) less likely be to respond ‘Somewhat’ ($B = -1.005$, OR = 0.366, $p < 0.01$), and 47.7% (= 100 * 1−[exp(−0.646)]) less likely to respond ‘A great deal’ ($B = -0.646$, OR = 0.523, $p < 0.05$) relative to ‘Not at all.’ Leisure societies significantly decreased the odds of answering ‘Not much’ ($B = -0.447$, OR = 0.639, $p < 0.01$) and ‘Somewhat’ ($B = -0.281$, OR = 0.754, $p < 0.05$) relative to ‘Not at all.’ The effects of community-based associations were not significant for any group.

Those who stated they have close friends and neighbours were 2.298 times more likely to respond ‘Not much’ ($B = 0.832$, OR = 2.298, $p < 0.01$), 4.014 times more likely to answer ‘Somewhat’ ($B = 1.390$, OR = 4.014, $p < 0.01$), and 3.659 times more likely to answer ‘A great deal’ ($B = 1.297$, OR = 3.659, $p < 0.01$) compared to answering ‘Not at all.’ The probabilities of this variable were highest among all independent variables.

The duration of residence was included based on the assumption that people who live in a community for a long time tend to have long-term relationships with neighbours, creating the expectation of a positive effect on social trust (Lochner, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 1999); however, the effects were only significant among those who answered ‘Not much’ ($B = 0.084$, OR = 1.087, $p < 0.05$). Combined with the insignificant impact of community-based associations on social trust, the results indicate that South Koreans’ social trust is not based on the community they live in. This may be a reflection of South Korea’s social context in which rapid development and urbanization encourage people to relocate to a newly-developed areas, while older areas are left undeveloped and impoverished. In line with the results, urban residents, who comprise more than 80% of the total population, were 31.3% less likely to respond ‘A great deal’ ($B = -0.375$, OR = 0.687, $p < 0.05$) than to respond ‘Not at all.’

Next, using political trust as the outcome variable, Multinomial regression models were structured to test the relaionship between social and political trust. Specifically, two regression models were used to compare the estimates when the economic and political performance variables were added. The coefficients were estimated using year-by-province fixed effects, and standard errors were clustered by both year and provincial-level region of South Korea. The results are shown in Table 3. Most importantly, both models indicated that social trust increases the likelihood of respondents having a higher level of political trust with statistical significance. This result differs from those of previous studies that focused either solely on South Korea (Kim, 2005; Suh et al., 2012) or on East Asian democracies that include South Korea (Choi & Woo, 2016; Kong, 2013).

In Model 1, those with a high level of social trust were 1.442 times more likely to respond ‘Not much’ ($B = 0.367$, OR = 1.442, $p < 0.01$), 2.581 times more likely to answer ‘Somewhat’ ($B = 0.948$, OR = 2.581, $p < 0.01$), and 5.382 times more likely to answer ‘A

Table 3. The impacts of social trust and economic and political performance on political trust.

	(1)						(2)					
	'Not much'		'Somewhat'		'A great deal'		'Not much'		'Somewhat'		'A great deal'	
Political Trust (reference: 'Not at all')	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR
Social Trust	0.367***	1.442	0.948***	2.581	1.683***	5.382	0.196***	1.216	0.652***	1.918	1.128***	3.090
	(0.039)		(0.044)		(0.176)		(0.042)		(0.051)		(0.166)	
Gender	−0.105**	0.900	−0.235***	0.790	−0.011	0.989	−0.104*	0.901	−0.237***	0.789	−0.009	0.991
(male = 1)	(0.049)		(0.053)		(0.187)		(0.053)		(0.062)		(0.176)	
Age	0.113***	1.119	0.183***	1.201	0.182**	1.199	0.115***	1.121	0.167***	1.182	0.135	1.144
	(0.022)		(0.024)		(0.090)		(0.025)		(0.029)		(0.084)	
Education	−0.024	0.975	−0.077***	0.925	−0.324***	0.723	0.039	1.039	0.020	1.019	−0.198**	0.820
	(0.025)		(0.027)		(0.095)		(0.027)		(0.032)		(0.091)	
Life satisfaction	0.083***	1.086	0.140***	1.150	0.244***	1.276	0.013	1.013	0.010	1.010	0.088*	1.092
	(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.049)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.048)	
Income	−0.002	0.997	−0.008	0.991	−0.062	0.940	−0.002	0.998	−0.010	0.989	−0.064	0.937
	(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.052)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.049)	
Association												
Political	−0.166	0.846	0.285	1.329	0.741	2.098	−0.188	0.828	0.187	1.205	0.587	1.798
	(0.203)		(0.207)		(0.467)		(0.229)		(0.253)		(0.470)	
Unions and professional	−0.022	0.978	−0.053	0.948	0.738*	2.092	0.164	1.177	0.219	1.244	0.927**	2.525
	(0.143)		(0.152)		(0.382)		(0.156)		(0.180)		(0.385)	
Community-based	0.016	1.015	0.079***	1.082	0.232***	1.260	−0.029	0.971	0.019	1.019	0.131*	1.139
	(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.081)		(0.030)		(0.033)		(0.078)	
Civic movement	−0.413**	0.661	−0.255	0.774	−1.476**	0.228	−0.410**	0.663	−0.295	0.744	−1.330**	0.264
	(0.170)		(0.176)		(0.652)		(0.188)		(0.213)		(0.604)	
Religious	0.217***	1.241	0.465***	1.591	0.768***	2.155	0.155**	1.167	0.335***	1.397	0.538**	1.713
	(0.073)		(0.076)		(0.216)		(0.078)		(0.088)		(0.211)	
Leisure	0.086	1.089	0.289***	1.335	0.200	1.221	0.125*	1.133	0.323***	1.380	0.229	1.257
	(0.068)		(0.072)		(0.241)		(0.075)		(0.085)		(0.229)	
Alumni	0.188***	1.206	0.151**	1.162	−0.088	0.915	0.091	1.095	−0.034	0.966	−0.255	0.775
	(0.056)		(0.060)		(0.208)		(0.062)		(0.071)		(0.197)	
Having close friends and neighbours	0.247***	1.279	0.500***	1.648	0.220	1.246	0.235**	1.265	0.562***	1.754	0.442	1.556
	(0.094)		(0.111)		(0.431)		(0.104)		(0.133)		(0.417)	
Duration of residence	−0.005	0.995	0.008	1.008	−0.069	0.933	−0.025	0.974	−0.017	0.983	−0.073	0.929
	(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.072)		(0.020)		(0.023)		(0.068)	
Urban	−0.284***	0.753	−0.403***	0.668	−0.138	0.871	−0.131*	0.877	−0.131	0.877	0.118	1.125
	(0.073)		(0.078)		(0.262)		(0.078)		(0.090)		(0.252)	
Economy							0.212***	1.236	0.425***	1.530	0.558***	1.747
							(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.049)	

Corruption							−2.264***	0.103	−4.016***	0.018	−3.791***	0.022
							(0.076)		(0.086)		(0.278)	
Inequality							−0.386***	0.680	−0.482***	0.617	−0.408**	0.665
							(0.053)		(0.064)		(0.192)	
Welfare							0.407***	1.502	1.071***	2.917	1.862***	6.436
							(0.062)		(0.068)		(0.205)	
Intercepts	0.398*	1.489	−2.180***	0.113	−9.601***	0.000	1.887***	6.598	−1.007***	0.365	−7.972***	0.000
	(0.218)		(0.244)		(1.105)		(0.235)		(0.302)		(0.977)	
Observations	19,690						19,690					
Pseudo R^2 (NK)	0.158						0.425					
Pseudo R^2 (CS)	0.137						0.367					
AIC	36,743.5						30,644.4					

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

great deal' ($B = 1.683$, OR = 5.382, $p < 0.01$) relative to answering 'Not at all.' The odds increased as the level of political trust increased. Model 2 showed a similar relationship between social and political trust: a high level of social trust increases the odds of 'Not much' by 1.216 times ($B = 0.196$, OR = 1.216, $p < 0.01$), the odds of 'Somewhat' by 1.918 times ($B = 0.6752$, OR = 1.918, $p < 0.01$), and the odds of 'A great deal' by 3.090 times ($B = -0.375$, OR = 0.687, $p < 0.05$) relative to 'Not at all.' Compared to the results produced by Model 1, adding the four institutional performance variables shown in Model 2 appeared to reduce the impacts of social trust on political trust although caution is recommended when comparing the regression coefficients of two nested logistic models because they can be misleading (Karlson, Holm, & Breen, 2012; Winship & Mare, 1984). Nevertheless, this finding indicates that the relationship between the two trusts in South Korea are in line with other post-2000 studies on Europe and the United States (Liu & Stolle, 2017).

It should be noted that adding the four economic and political performance variables substantially increased the goodness of fit. The dramatic increase in the r-squared from Model 1 (Nagelkerke: 0.158, Cox and Snell: 0.137) to Model 2 (Nagelkerke: 0.425, Cox and Snell: 0.367) indicates that a greater portion of political trust is explained by the performance of political institutions, which supports institutionalist arguments (Choi & Woo, 2016; Mishler & Rose, 2005). Moreover, all four institutional performance variables in model 2 showed significant relationships on political trust: respondents' evaluations of economic performance had significant positive effects on 'Not much' ($B = 0.212$, OR = 1.236, $p < 0.01$), 'Somewhat' ($B = 0.425$, OR = 1.530, $p < 0.01$), and 'A great deal' ($B = 0.558$, OR = 1.747, $p < 0.01$) relative to 'Not at all.' Those who believed that corruption is serious were less likely to answer 'Not much' ($B = -2.264$, OR = 0.103, $p < 0.01$), 'Somewhat' ($B = -4.016$, OR = 0.018, $p < 0.01$), and 'A great deal' ($B = -3.791$, OR = 0.022, $p < 0.01$) relative to 'Not at all.' For inequality, the odds of answering 'Not much' were lower by 32% ($B = -0.386$, OR = 0.680, $p < 0.01$), the odds of 'Somewhat' were lower by 38% ($B = -0.482$, OR = 0.617, $p < 0.01$), and the odds of 'A great deal' were lower by 33% ($B = -0.408$, OR = 0.665, $p < 0.05$) relative to 'Not at all.' Positive evaluations of the welfare system increased the odds of answering 'Not much' by 1.502 times ($B = 0.407$, OR = 1.502, $p < 0.01$), 'Somewhat' by 1.9 times ($B = 1.071$, OR = 2.917, $p < 0.01$), and 'A great deal' by 3.1 times ($B = -0.375$, OR = 0.687, $p < 0.05$) compared to 'Not at all.'

Among the personal demographic characteristics, the male population tended to show a lower likelihood of having political trust than the female population for both models. For Model 1, males were less likely to respond 'Not much' ($B = -0.105$, OR = 0.900, $p < 0.05$) and 'Somewhat' ($B = -0.235$, OR = 0.790, $p < 0.01$) than to respond 'Not at all,' and the result was similar for Model 2. Age had a significant positive effect on 'Not much' ($B = 0.113$, OR = 1.119, $p < 0.01$), 'Somewhat' ($B = 1.071$, OR = 2.917, $p < 0.01$), and 'A great deal' ($B = 0.182$, OR = 1.199, $p < 0.05$) for Model 1, and the effects were also positive for Model 2. Educational attainment tended to decrease the probabilities of a high level of political trust. Along with the results shown in Table 2, it is notable that educational attainment increased respondents' likelihood of having moderate and strong social trust but decreased the likelihood of having moderate and strong political trust. Regarding personal success and well-being, life satisfaction increased the probabilities of having strong political trust for both models, but income did not show any significant effect on any level of political trust for either model.

Different types of associations had different impacts on political trust. The type of association that showed significant effects at all levels of political trust for both models is religious association, which means that religious association in South Korea is a strong source of political trust. For both models, those who actively participated in religious associations tended to show higher probabilities of having a higher level of political trust. Participation in unions and professional associations and participation in community-based associations increased the odds of answering 'A great deal' in comparison to 'Not at all.' Leisure societies and alumni significantly increased the odds of answering 'Somewhat' compared to 'Not at all;' however, political and civic activism did not seem to increase trust in political institutions: participation in political associations, which provides members with more opportunities to communicate with politicians and political institutions, did not show any significant effect, while participation in civic movement associations decreased the odds of having political trust.

Having close friends and neighbours significantly increased the probability of answering 'Not much' and 'Somewhat' compared to 'Not at all,' but the effect was not significant for 'A great deal.' The urban population tended to have a lower probability than the rural population of answering 'Not much' and 'Somewhat.'

As discussed, when measuring political trust, some studies used respondents' averaged trust for all suggested political institutions (e.g. Chang & Chu, 2006; Choi & Woo, 2016; Mishler & Rose, 2005), while other studies used trust in the most influential political institution, such as the central government (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005) or parliament (e.g. Kim, 2005; Newton, 2006). Therefore, two additional models were structured for citizens' trust in the central government and in parliament. The coefficients were estimated using year-by-province fixed effects, and standard errors were clustered by both year and provincial-level region of South Korea. Table 4 provides the results. The relationship between social trust and trust in the two institutions is consistent with the results shown in Table 3. For trust in government, social trust increased the odds of 'Not much' by 7% ($B = 0.068$, OR = 1.070, $p < 0.10$), the odds of 'Somewhat' by 58% ($B = 0.458$, OR = 1.580, $p < 0.01$), and the odds of 'A great deal' by 122.6% ($B = 0.335$, OR = 1.397, $p < 0.01$) compared to 'Not at all.' For trust in parliament, social trust increased the odds of 'Not much' by 10.3% ($B = 0.098$, OR = 1.030, $p < 0.01$), the odds of 'Somewhat' by 71.9% ($B = 0.542$, OR = 1.719, $p < 0.01$), and the odds of 'A great deal' by 158.4% ($B = 0.949$, OR = 1.397, $p < 0.01$) relative to 'Not at all.' The economic and political performance variables also showed similar results for both institutions.

In addition to the effects of social trust and economic and political performance variables, there were other noteworthy results. First, the impacts of age on trust in government and parliament were different. For trust in government, age clearly increased the likelihood of 'Not much,' 'Somewhat,' and 'A great deal,' but for trust in parliament, age did not show a significant relationship with any level of trust. This indicates a generation gap among South Koreans regarding their views on the government and parliament. Second, the role of religious organizations in South Korean society is noteworthy. Along with the results provided in Table 3, religious organization is the only type of organization that consistently showed significant effects on all levels of trust across models. Third, the effects of participation in political associations became significant when it was regressed on the government ('A great deal') and parliament ('Not much' and 'Somewhat') rather than on the averaged trust in the seven political institutions. Finally,

Table 4. The impacts of social trust and economic and political performance on trust in the government and parliament.

	Government						Parliament					
	'Not much'		'Somewhat'		'A great deal'		'Not much'		'Somewhat'		'A great deal'	
Political Trust (reference: 'Not at all')	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR
Social Trust	0.068*	1.070	0.458***	1.580	0.801***	2.226	0.098***	1.103	0.542***	1.719	0.949***	2.584
	(0.036)		(0.045)		(0.121)		(0.029)		(0.045)		(0.128)	
Gender (male = 1)	−0.082*	0.921	−0.132**	0.876	0.055	1.056	−0.146***	0.863	−0.254***	0.775	−0.063	0.939
	(0.045)		(0.053)		(0.131)		(0.035)		(0.051)		(0.134)	
Age	0.134***	1.142	0.229***	1.257	0.269***	1.308	−0.007	0.992	−0.031	0.969	0.009	1.009
	(0.021)		(0.025)		(0.064)		(0.016)		(0.023)		(0.062)	
Education	0.028	1.027	0.018	1.018	−0.122*	0.885	0.001	1.000	−0.027	0.973	−0.157**	0.973
	(0.023)		(0.027)		(0.067)		(0.018)		(0.026)		(0.070)	
Life satisfaction	−0.005	0.994	−0.005	0.994	0.054	1.055	−0.005	0.995	−0.026*	0.973	0.026	1.026
	(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.036)		(0.009)		(0.014)		(0.039)	
Income	−0.004	0.995	0.008	1.008	−0.076**	0.926	0.0002	1.000	−0.005	0.995	−0.052	0.949
	(0.012)		(0.014)		(0.036)		(0.009)		(0.013)		(0.036)	
Association												
Political	−0.246	0.781	0.050	1.051	0.953***	2.593	0.286*	1.330	0.366**	1.442	0.418	1.518
	(0.187)		(0.205)		(0.319)		(0.149)		(0.184)		(0.380)	
Unions and professional	0.070	1.072	−0.067	0.935	0.117	1.123	0.129	1.138	0.211	1.234	0.023	1.023
	(0.129)		(0.151)		(0.311)		(0.105)		(0.141)		(0.352)	
Community-based	−0.045*	0.956	−0.020	0.979	0.163***	1.177	−0.006	0.994	0.045*	1.046	0.111*	1.117
	(0.024)		(0.027)		(0.055)		(0.018)		(0.025)		(0.063)	
Civic movement	−0.603***	0.547	−0.472***	0.623	−1.006***	0.365	−0.444***	0.641	0.009	1.008	−0.041	0.960
	(0.153)		(0.173)		(0.372)		(0.127)		(0.158)		(0.346)	
Religious	0.299***	1.348	0.432***	1.539	0.617***	1.853	0.080*	1.083	0.242***	1.273	0.334**	1.397
	(0.066)		(0.074)		(0.157)		(0.048)		(0.065)		(0.159)	
Leisure	−0.033	0.967	0.177**	1.193	−0.063	0.939	0.006	1.005	0.091	1.005	0.548***	1.730
	(0.061)		(0.070)		(0.167)		(0.047)		(0.066)		(0.152)	
Alumni	0.035	1.035	0.016	1.016	0.185	1.203	−0.170***	0.843	−0.385***	0.680	−0.017	0.983
	(0.052)		(0.060)		(0.140)		(0.039)		(0.056)		(0.142)	
Having close friends and neighbours	0.133	1.142	0.202*	1.223	1.178**	3.247	0.116	1.122	0.108	1.114	0.493	1.637
	(0.094)		(0.117)		(0.478)		(0.078)		(0.119)		(0.417)	
Duration of residence	−0.008	0.992	0.012	1.011	0.054	1.055	−0.002	0.997	−0.011	0.989	−0.004	0.996
	(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.055)		(0.013)		(0.019)		(0.054)	
Urban	−0.035	0.965	0.078	1.080	0.156	1.168	−0.057	0.944	0.081	1.084	0.624***	1.866
	(0.065)		(0.077)		(0.180)		(0.051)		(0.074)		(0.228)	
Economy	0.233***	1.262	0.425***	1.529	0.584***	1.793	0.222***	1.248	0.439***	1.550	0.574***	1.774
	(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.036)		(0.010)		(0.014)		(0.038)	

Corruption	−1.348***	0.259	−2.665***	0.069	−2.890***	0.055	−0.859***	0.423	−1.837***	0.159	−2.265***	0.103
	(0.048)		(0.060)		(0.210)		(0.036)		(0.063)		(0.240)	
Inequality	−0.345***	0.708	−0.365***	0.694	0.032	1.032	−0.334***	0.716	−0.387***	0.679	0.004	1.004
	(0.045)		(0.055)		(0.135)		(0.037)		(0.055)		(0.142)	
Welfare	0.185***	1.203	0.800***	2.226	1.031***	2.803	0.114***	1.120	0.702***	2.017	0.574***	1.775
	(0.049)		(0.055)		(0.136)		(0.036)		(0.051)		(0.135)	
Intercepts	1.035***	2.814	−1.663***	0.189	−8.287***	0.000	0.033	1.034	−3.428***	0.032	−8.963***	0.000
	(0.214)		(0.258)		(0.784)		(0.170)		(0.255)		(0.774)	
Observations	19,690						19,690					
Pseudo R^2 (NK)	0.379						0.301					
Pseudo R^2 (CS)	0.338						0.267					
AIC	35,483.4						36,943.9					

$^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

participation in an alumni association had a negative impact on trust in parliament, while the effects were not significant for trust in government. This shows that different voluntary associations play different roles in South Korean society.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The aims of this study were to reexamine the relationship between social and political trust in the context of South Korea and to contribute to the broader discussions of social capital, which assume that citizens' levels of social trust are positively associated with their levels of political trust. The results of this study show that South Korean citizens with high levels of social trust tend to have high levels of trust in political institutions, including the government and parliament. This relationship is contrary to the results of Kim's (2005) study in which a national survey conducted in 2001 was used, and it is stronger both statistically and substantially than the results of Suh et al.'s (2012) study in which the 2003–2005 Korean General Social Survey was used. This finding is also different from other studies on Asian democracies that include South Korea (Choi & Woo, 2016; Kong, 2013). The strong positive relationship between social and political trust is also in line with other post-2000 studies on Europe and the United States (Liu & Stolle, 2017).

There are three potential explanations for this change. First, Kim (2005) argued that the reason for the discrepancy between social and political trust is that South Korean civil society in the early 2000s still had the legacy of an authoritarian culture and lacked the civic skills required for full-blown democracy. From this perspective, it is possible that the association between the two trusts may have been strengthened over the course of social and economic liberalization in the 2000s. Second, Kim also argued that the negative relation between social and political trust in the early 2000s is related to the gap between citizens' expectations and their evaluations of institutional performance. Considering that the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 devastated the South Korean economy and significantly changed all aspects of society until the mid-2000s, the years that these surveys were conducted (2013–2015) may have influenced the finding of a more normalized relationship between the two trusts. Third, previous studies used a national survey with smaller sample sizes than this study. It is possible that the development of survey instruments may have led to different results. Why or how the relationship has changed is beyond the scope of this study, and it is too early to determine whether this positive relationship is temporary or consistent; however, the new results indicate that South Koreans' social trust has translated to their level of political trust in recent years.

It is not argued that the South Korean democracy has reached full maturity. Studies on South Korean politics have shown that the state-society relationship in South Korea still remains contentious because the strong state, which has actively led South Korean economic development, is being challenged by an increasingly strengthened civil society, hindering the development of democratic governance (Dwivedi, 2017; Kim, 2012; Oh, 2012; Rose et al., 1999). They point out that the contentious relationship continues due to the ineffective political parties, unorganized civil societies, and ill-defined interest groups; however, this study highlights the fact that citizens who trust each other may have learned to communicate with actors in political institutions, evaluate their performances, and build a trusting relationship with them in recent years. The perception of South

Korean democracy as simply a new, and thus incomplete, democracy may need to be reconsidered.

Although social trust increased political trust with or without controlling for economic and political performance in the models, it should be noted that the economic and political performance variables were proven to be stronger determinants of political trust than social trust. The regression models showed that a larger portion of variation in political trust was explained by the variation of economic and political performance than for social trust. This also supports the institutionalist argument that institutional performance should be considered a stronger short-term predictor for political trust; however, it should not lead to a depreciation of values of social trust in predicting political trust. As discussed, social capital theorists do not negate the importance of the performance of institutions to political trust, just as institutionalists acknowledge the role of social trust (Liu & Stolle, 2017; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). They argue that institutional performance better explains temporal variations of trust, while social trust is a more fundamental source of political trust (Norris, 1999; Suh et al., 2012).

In addition to the relationship between social and political trust, there are several noteworthy findings that yielded important implications. Education increased social trust but decreased political trust. This result indicates that the demographic characteristic that shows the clearest discrepancy between social trust and political trust is education. Along with age, the educated younger generation's relative distrust in political institutions, especially in government, was also revealed by the results. Older citizens in South Korea still remember the authoritarian government-led economic development from the past, but younger citizens, who do not have these memories, are skeptical about the leadership of government and recognize the gap between the democratic ideals and reality.

Citizens' participation in voluntary associations has been considered a critical component in functioning democracy since De Tocqueville's (2003) findings; however, the results also indicate that not all types of associations had the same effects on social and political trust. In particular, the role of religious associations is noteworthy and requires further study. Participation in religious associations had positive effects on both social trust and political trust, and the effects were consistent across models. Also, South Koreans who participated in alumni associations tended to distrust parliament, which requires further study as well. These different effects of associations support some studies that categorized social associations based on their different relations to social capital (e.g. Moore & Recker, 2016; Rupasingha & Goetz, 2008).

Another interesting finding is that South Koreans' social trust is not closely related to where they live. While more than 80% of South Korean citizens live in cities, living in urban areas and the duration of residence did not indicate trust in others. Also, participation in community-based associations did not have a strong effect on social trust. This means that social trust in South Korea does not rely on community-based 'informal social connections,' as Putnam called them, or 'many little public sidewalk contacts,' as Jacobs stated (Jacobs, 1992, p. 56; Putnam, 2001, pp. 94–115).

In conclusion, a key component that is critical to the success of the democratic system is the public's support and trust (Easton, 1975). A social capital theory that focuses on social and political trust has been tested in the context of South Korea, a relatively new democracy that is nevertheless in line with other advanced democracies in establishing a positive relationship between social and political trust; however, there are some limitations of this

study. Both the dependent and independent variables were drawn from the same source, and thus the study is susceptible to common method bias. The possibility of endogeneity also exists in this study. Moreover, the three-year data do not provide sufficient longitudinal implications. Further research could focus on the long-term relationship between social and political trust in South Korea, especially regarding when and how the relationship has changed. In addition, subsequent studies on other consolidated democracies, such as Taiwan, could also contribute to the theories of social capital and democratization.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments that greatly contributed to improving the final version of the paper. They would also like to thank the editors for their support during the review process. Finally, they would like to thank Dr. Aldrich and Dr. O'Brien for their comments and support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Juheon Lee http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4516-8766

Notes on contributors

Juheon Lee is a PhD candidate in political science at Northeastern University, Boston, USA. His research interests center on social capital, community resilience, and social and political identities.

Daniel Yi is an undergraduate student in the Political Science program at Northeastern University, Boston, USA.

References

Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five countries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook for the theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press.

Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, *41*, 999–1023.

Chang, E. C., & Chu, Y. H. (2006). Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian democracies? *The Journal of Politics*, *68*(2), 259–271.

Choi, E., & Woo, J. (2016). The origins of political trust in East Asian democracies: Psychological, cultural, and institutional arguments. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, *17*(3), 410–426.

Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundation of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2003). Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies. *European Societies*, *5*(2), 93–137.

De Tocqueville, A. (2003). *Democracy in America* (Vol. 10). Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing.

Dwivedi, S. S. (2017). Civil society and democracy in East Asia with special reference to South Korea. *Journal of Social and Economic Development*, *19*(1), 211–226.

Easton, D. (1975). A Re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, *5*, 435–457.
Foley, M. W., & Edwards, B. (1999). Is it time to disinvest in social capital? *Journal of Public Policy*, *19*(02), 141–173.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity* (No. D10 301 c. 1/c. 2). New York: Free Press.
Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1999). Postmodernization brings declining respect for authority but rising support for democracy. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government* (pp. 236–256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackman, R. W., & Miller, R. A. (1996). A renaissance of political culture? *American Journal of Political Science*, *40*, 632–659.
Jacobs, J. (1992). *The death and life of great cities, 1961*. Reprint. New York: Vintage.
Kaase, M. (1999). Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalised political participation in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, *22*(3), 1–21.
Kang, W. (2015). Inequality, the welfare system and satisfaction with democracy in South Korea. *International Political Science Review*, *36*(5), 493–509.
Karlson, K. B., Holm, A., & Breen, R. (2012). Comparing regression coefficients between same-sample nested models using logit and probit: A new method. *Sociological Methodology*, *42*(1), 286–313.
Kim, J. Y. (2005). "Bowling together" isn't a cure-all: The relationship between social capital and political trust in South Korea. *International Political Science Review*, *26*(2), 193–213.
Kim, S. (2010). Public trust in government in Japan and South Korea: Does the rise of critical citizens matter? *Public Administration Review*, *70*(5), 801–810.
Kim, S. (2012). "Contentious democracy" in South Korea: An active civil society and ineffectual political parties. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, *8*(2), 51–61.
Kong, D. T. (2013). Intercultural experience as an impediment of trust: Examining the impact of intercultural experience and social trust culture on institutional trust in government. *Social Indicators Research*, *113*(3), 847–858.
Liu, C., & Stolle, D. (2017). Social capital, civic culture and political trust. In S. Zmerli, & T. W. G. van der Meer (Eds.), *Handbook on political trust* (pp. 338–352). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Lochner, K., Kawachi, I., & Kennedy, B. P. (1999). Social capital: A guide to its measurement. *Health & Place*, *5*(4), 259–270.
Loury, G. (1977). A dynamic theory of racial income differences. *Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination*, *153*, 86–153.
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, *34*(1), 30–62.
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2005). What are the political consequences of trust? A test of cultural and institutional theories in Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, *38*(9), 1050–1078.
Moore, M. D., & Recker, N. L. (2016). Social capital, type of crime, and social control. *Crime & Delinquency*, *62*(6), 728–747.
Morris, S. D., & Klesner, J. L. (2010). Corruption and trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from Mexico. *Comparative Political Studies*, *43*(10), 1258–1285.
Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review*, *22*(2), 201–214.
Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). *Confidence in public institutions. Disaffected democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Newton, K., & Zmerli S. (2011). Three forms of trust and their association. *European Political Science Review*, *3*(2), 169–200.
Norris, P. (1999). Institutional explanations for political support. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government* (pp. 217). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oh, J. S. (2012). Strong state and strong civil society in contemporary South Korea: Challenges to democratic governance. *Asian Survey*, *52*(3), 528–549.
Oskarsson, S. (2010). Generalized trust and political support: A cross-national investigation. *Acta Politica*, *45*(4), 423–443.
Park, C. (2017). Political trust in the Asia-Pacific region. In S. Zmerli, & T. W. G. van der Meer (Eds.), *Handbook on political trust* (pp. 488–508). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Pharr, S. J., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (2000). *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (2001). *The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press.
Rahn, W. M., & Rudolph, T. J. (2005). A tale of political trust in American cities. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *69*(4), 530–560.
Rose, R., Shin, D. C., & Munro, N. (1999). Tensions between the democratic ideal and reality: South Korea. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance* (pp. 146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rupasingha, A., & Goetz, S. J. (2008). *US country-level social capital data, 1990-2005*. University Park: Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development, Penn State University.
Schyns, P., & Koop, C. (2010). Political distrust and social capital in Europe and the USA. *Social Indicators Research*, *96*(1), 145–167.
Sonderskov, K. M., & Dinesen, P. T. (2014). Danish exceptionalism: Explaining the unique increase in social trust over the past 30 years. *European Sociological Review*, *30*(6), 782–795.
Suh, C. S., Chang, P. Y., & Lim, Y. (2012, June). Spill-up and spill-over of trust: An extended test of cultural and institutional theories of trust in South Korea. *Sociological Forum*, *27*(2), 504–526.
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Van der Meer, T. W., & Zmerli, S. (2017). The deeply rooted concern with political trust. In Sonja Zmerli, & T.W. Van der Meer (Eds.), *Handbook on Political Trust*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Weber, M. (2002). *The Protestant ethic and the "spirit" of capitalism and other writings*. London: Penguin.
Winship, C., & Mare, R. D. (1984). Regression models with ordinal variables. *American Sociological Review*, *49*, 512–525.
Zmerli, S., & Newton, K. (2008). Social trust and attitudes toward democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *72*(4), 706–724.